China is now the world's largest destination of FDI, despite assessments highlighting its institutional deficiencies. But this FDI inflow corresponds closely to predicted FDI flows into China from a model that predicts FDI inflow based on government quality indicators and controls and is estimated across a sample of other weak-institution countries. The only real discrepancy is that, if government quality is measured by constraints on executive power, China receives somewhat more FDI than the model predicts. This might reflect an underestimation of the strength of these constraints in China, a unique institutional setting for FDI operations, FDI based on expected future institutional improvements, or a unique Chinese model of development. We conclude that Ockham's razor disfavors the last. We also note that FDI may be elevated because Chinese institutions protected foreign firms better than domestic ones.
Introduction
China now receives more foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) than any other country, despite ongoing and sometimes vociferous criticism of the quality of its government in the foreign media. This is curious because foreign direct investment involves much irreversible fixed investment, which is sensitive to investors' perception of public policies and property rights. This study examines how the quality of China's government affects its allocation of FDI, and whether or not China's inflow of FDI is in some sense "exceptional" given the quality of its government.
In this paper, we show that China's FDI inflow goes disproportionately to provinces that have better institutions. We then show how the allocation of inward FDI across countries correlates with three key dimensions of "good government." These are
1.
The general quality of government. To measure this, we use appraisals of official respect for private property rights, freedom from official corruption, and the quality of public investment in infrastructure.
2.
The strength of constraints on executive power. Here we again use appraisals, but focusing specifically on the freedom of action the country's institutions accorded to its head of government. Intuitively, constraints on executive power prevent a country's head of government from ruling by decree, arbitrarily nullifying or modifying contracts and property rights, or capriciously altering the rules of the economic game in other ways. If legislatures must be consulted and court rulings must be sought before such actions can be taken, the future policy direction will less likely to be arbitrary and opportunistic.
This variable captures how dependent the quality of government is on the decisions of the head of government and his immediate associates.
The government's track record.
A government that has generated impressive economic growth in the past is likely to interest foreign investors regardless of outsiders' appraisals of its institutions. We therefore consider past economic growth as an implicit measure of government track record. Since past policies are most useful in predicting the future in countries with stable governments, we also include past government stability as a variable in our analysis.
Within this framework, we show that China's track record of past growth goes far in explaining the magnitude of its FDI inflow, despite offsetting deficiencies in the quality of its government. This framework, estimated using country-level FDI inflows and national government quality measures, is applied out-of-sample to predict the allocation of FDI inflow to China, given analogous measures of its quality of government. The errors in this out-of-sample prediction exercise are comparable to those in the initial cross country data used to calibrate the model.
Repeating this exercise using different subsets of our "quality of government" measures is also instructive. If we calibrate the cross-country model using only "control of corruption" from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), China actually seems to attract appropriate levels of FDI. But if we calibrate the model using only measures of the "strength of constraints on executive power" or "responsible government", China seems to attract "too much" FDI.
We draw three conclusions from these results:
1. "Good government" and expectations of stable and strong economic growth attract foreign direct investment. China's large FDI inflow, interpreted in this light, is not mysterious. Indeed, if China had higher quality government, it would attract even more foreign direct investment.
2.
The dimensions of "good government" that matter to FDI inflow do not seem to include general measures of the quality of government -limits on corruption, expropriation risk, government contract repudiations, and the like -but do include gauges of the way the country's government functions -and especially on how limited executive powers are.
3.
We find that measures of the strength of executive constraints predict a lower FDI inflow for China than we observe. This might imply that part of China's FDI inflow is in some sense "exceptional". But more prosaic explanations also present themselves: the strength of checks on executive power in China may be underestimated; or FDI investments may be subject to atypical institutional environments within China; or FDI may reflect expectations about future institutional reforms along this dimension.
While data problems caution against overstressing this third conclusion, we suspect such misperceptions may well be systematic in China's case. In exploring these issues, we note that deficiencies in China's institutional environment that disadvantage local firms relative to foreign controlled operations may well deter domestic entrepreneurs to the relative advantage of foreign investors. Any elevation in China's FDI inflow then reflects structural inefficiency -foreign
controlled operations doing what domestically controlled firms might do given better institutions -rather than an intrinsic contribution of FDI to growth. If this explains the third point above,
Chinese exceptionalism is hardly a role model for development. (See Huang 2003.) In the next section, we motivate our research question. Section three describes our research issues, while sections four and five present our Chinese and cross-country analyses, and section six fits China within the latter. Section seven discusses our results and what they imply about FDI flows and China's institutional environment, and section eight concludes.
The Issues
The importance of sound institutions to economic development is now received wisdom. Solid property rights protection and respect for the rule of the law are viewed as basic factors that determine macroeconomic stability, capital market development, business sector development, and investment in innovation -see La Porta et al.(1998) , Acemoglu et al. (2003) , Durnev et al. (2004) , , and many others. To lay the groundwork for answering these questions, we next consider the determinants of FDI inflow.
FDI Allocation in the Global Economy
The literature on FDI, though voluminous, points us towards a relatively simple generic empirical specification.
The starting point of the modern FDI literature is the Coasean Theory of the Firm, as set forth in Coase (1937) , Caves (1971) , Buckley and Casson (1975) , Caves (1982) , and others. In essence, prospective multinational firms are envisioned as possessing information-based firmspecific capabilities that they could profitably apply in foreign countries. Agency problems, information asymmetries, and property rights protection problems that render information based assets inalienable prevent these firms from selling or leasing those capabilities to foreign firms.
To profitably apply their unique capabilities abroad, multinationals have resort to establish controlled foreign operations -to engage in FDI. In short, a range of market failure problems force multinationals to opt for integration over arm's-length transactions. depends not only on the project, but also on the capabilities of the firm contemplating it. And these, in turn, often depend on public policies. For example, factors like the quality of laws, the security of property rights, and the viability of public infrastructure, broadly interpreted to include educated workers as well as good roads, often affect the value of a business and also the desirable mode of operation.
More specifically, the location of a firm's operations is thought to depend on a range of economic and public policy conditions. The NPV a firm sees in a generic investment depends positively on product and factor market development, growth potential, and the availability of financing. It depends negatively on market risks and the costs of doing business. The last is especially emphasized, with contributing factors including: high taxes, high wages relative to productivity, and generally poor infrastructure. Caves (1982) (Foley, Mahir, and Hines, 2004) .
All these factors, including the development of the financial system, depend on an economy's institutional environment -its rules, regulations, and informal codes of behavior. As emphasized above, sound and well-enforced rules and regulations, like property rights protection and information disclosure, encourage economic development in general and capital market development in particular (La Porta et al., 1997 and 1998; King and Levine, 1993) . The reason is that these rules and regulations constrain opportunistic behavior and build transactional trust between parties (North 1991).
However, establishing and administering sound rules and regulations requires "good government". The quality of the government thus matters. Governments that are less corrupt, have more efficient bureaucracies, and that impose less burdensome regulations foster economic development. Alfaro et al. (2005) show that weak institutions explain why very little capital flows from rich to poor countries. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) show preliminary evidence that FDI flows towards locations with a sounder governance infrastructure, which includes how well the legal system enforces contracts and protects property rights, how free the government is from corruption, and how efficient the government is; that is, how well regulators and other bureaucrats avoid imposing unnecessarily burdensome regulations 1 . Their result could reflect countries with better institutions having strong growth opportunities, which attract FDI.
Governments are, of course, staffed by people. Sound institutions require high quality government, and this requires high quality politicians and government employees. Just as good corporate executives are products of good internal corporate governance, high quality politicians and civil servants arise from sound public institutions. This circularity can lock in either good or bad government.
What sort of circle a country fits into is a key determinant of its attractiveness to foreign firms undertaking FDI. Transparent and orderly political competition and constraints on executive constraints seem paramount. find stronger constraints on government associated with less corruption and with more predictable policies and regulations.
They unbundle institutions into those protecting contracts and those protecting property. The former institutions facilitate contractual arrangements between transacting parties. The latter constrain public officials from acting arbitrarily for personal gains. Investment and growth appear better explained by the latter, while the former primarily influence only the forms of contracting that occur.
Constraints on executive power are particularly worthy of attention when we examine countries that recently feature phenomenal growth. These countries, of which China is one, need external capital to capture their growth opportunities. To attract foreign capital, their governments should be particularly enthusiastic about implementing and enforcing property rights, honoring policy commitments, and avoiding burdensome regulations. But foreign investors' concerns are often not such governments' current stances, but how they might act once the investments are in place, especially should growth and investment opportunities become less abundant. Constraints on executive power prevent heads of government from abruptly altering property rights, revising policies, reneging on commitments, and capriciously imposing new regulations. In short, they prevent short term actions, like precipitous expropriation, in the event of a negative shock. Executive constraints, especially if safeguarded by political competition, should reinforce the attractiveness of current business opportunities to foreign direct investment by providing credible assurances about the permanence of those policies.
Finally, the cost of doing business in any country depends on intangible factors -the mentality of its residents. Ample empirical evidence shows that "culture" affects economic outcomes by affecting economic agents' prior beliefs, preferred economic activities, and political choices. For a comprehensive and informative survey, see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) .
Mostly recently, Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2006) show that attitudes (in this case, attitudes towards egalitarianism) affect cross-border economic exchanges because they affect how people interact and negotiate on economic matters. A huge management literature emphasizes how the commercial success of FDI hinges on how well a firm protects its property rights and overcomes a range of agency and information asymmetry problem -foreign investors are particularly handicapped to achieve these goals. Consequently, if locals make transparent and predictable use of norms, or established legal and political institutions, to adjudicate disputes, this liability of being foreign diminishes and FDI flows in more abundantly.
In summary, inward FDI is attracted by basic sets of economic and institutional factors.
The economic factors include the size of the market, expectations on growth, normal costs of doing business such as labor and input costs, infrastructure development, and financial market development. Obviously, the host country's currency may affect foreign firms' local input factor costs. The institutional factors include general measures of "good government" such as the public's attitude towards law and order, the quality of government bureaucracy, and the efficiency of the legal system, as well as specific factors like the strength of constraints on executive power.
The Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment across China
This section examines the distribution of inward FDI in China, and how it is related to the quality of government.
Our key dependent variable is province-level inward FDI, denoted FDI, taken from China's Statistics Yearbook, defined as "investment by foreign companies and individuals".
Unfortunately, "foreign companies" include Chinese firms registered abroad. Also, the "investments" include foreign loans taken out by firms undertaking State-approved investment projects. This noise is unavoidable, for these data are the best available.
Our key independent variables gauge the "quality of government" in each province.
They are from surveys of firms' experience with property rights protection and corruption.
Private legal property right protection is from a city by city survey in which business executives are asked: "In disputes that your company was involved, what was the likelihood that the property and contractual rights get legal protection?" The answer can range from 0 to 100%, and our variable is the average of answers across surveyed companies sorted by the province of their headquarters' city. City averages are aggregated to provide province-level data.
To measure corruption, we use entertainment and travel costs -2003 data on the proportion of company expenses classified as "entertainment and traveling costs" expressed as a fraction of sales. Cai, Fang and Xu (2005) show that this number is higher in cities with worse bureaucratic burdens. While these costs erode earnings, they presumably also function as bribes and bring benefits that are higher in cities with worse bureaucratic burdens and worse government services. Hence, the data capture bribery payments to "grease" a corrupt government's "grabbing hand". In other words, the variable could reflect a government's discretionary power.
Figures 2 and 3 reveal that firms located in slower growing provinces spend more on entertainment and travel; and that executives in those provinces also believe legal protection to private property rights to be weaker. Figures 4 and 5 show these same measures of institutional quality similarly correlated with economic growth. Not only do weak institutions correlate with poverty, they also correlate with retarded growth.
All of these correlations are statistically significant at standard confidence levels save one, the correlation between private property rights and per capita GDP growth. However, this is due to a single outlier -Inner Mongolia. Once that outlier is deleted, the positive relationship is also statistically significant. power and yet is only weakly associated with legal protection for private property rights.
Ideally, our next step would be to conduct multiple regressions that capture the relationship between inward FDI and our government quality variables controlling for the level of general economic development, infrastructure, wages, size, taxes, and the like. To overcome these obstacles, we therefore turn to cross-country analysis.
The Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment across Countries
This section examines the international allocation of inward FDI, as tabulated the World Bank WDI database. Our dependent variable is per capita FDI in constant 2000 US dollars, winsorized at the tail 1 percent. 3 We add a constant to this quantity because some countries have negative FDI inflows (negative FDI inflow represents repatriation of previous investment). 4 Dropping the negative FDI inflow observations leads to qualitative similar results. However, we are not aware of significant economic reasons to exclude the observations.
Our intentions are twofold. First, we wish to further investigate our thesis that "good government" attracts FDI. Second, we wish to see if the FDI flowing into China behaves similarly to that flowing into other countries.
To these ends, we regress each country's FDI inflows on a set of country characteristics associated with the quality of government. We exclude China from these regressions and then ask how well the estimated parameters explain FDI flowing into China.
FDI is large if foreign corporate investors regard a location's investment opportunities highly. Obviously, investment opportunities are more abundant in locations with better institutions, where government officials are not corrupt, bureaucracies are efficient, and the rule of law is generally upheld. At the same time, positive shocks on investment opportunities often entice governments seeking to attract foreign capital to provide these institutions. Hence, a simple relationship between measures of government quality and foreign direct investment could be misleading. At the very least, to sort this out, our empirical investigation should incorporate a proxy for the presence of profitable investment opportunities.
Corporate investors' inclination to invest in any such opportunities depends on their expectations about how well the government is likely to behave over the operational lifetime of the investment. In particular, foreign investors' property rights are particularly vulnerable to partial, or even complete, expropriation by host country governments. Savvy foreign investors are therefore at least as worried about future government behavior as about current policies.
Fiscal stress or political reorientation can easily transform a country's business environment from welcoming to overtly hostile. Ideology can drive such transformations, but so can short-term political opportunism.
The purpose of constraints on executive power is to prevent abrupt changes in policy without due political debate and at least a degree of consensus. In the absence of such constraints, currently attractive institutions are in danger of being radically and unpredictably transformed should the country get a new head of government with new policies and priorities, different ethical standards, or a different level of affection for foreign investors.
Given these considerations, we evaluate each country's quality of government with the variables gauging the strength of constraints on executive power, the general quality of government, and the government's track record as regards its economy.
We use two variables to capture the strength of constraints on executive power: Responsible government is constructed from the Polity IV database and rates each country on a democracy-autocracy scale. First, in the data base an autocracy variable is available, ranging from 0 to 10, with a larger number indicating a more autocratic government. Also available is an analogous democracy index ranges from 0 to 10, but with a larger number means a more democratic government. Our responsible government variable is the democracy index minus the autocracy index, a measure called polity2 in the database. It captures the extent to which a political regime is responsible to its people, the larger the number the stronger the democratic checks on the political system.
In addition to our executive power limitation variables, we consider a range of measures of the more general quality of government. Two of these are explicit appraisals of the country's quality of government:
Rule of law is an ICRG survey result gauging the state of law and order in each country.
It ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values connoting greater general respect for the rule of law. 5 It contains a law component, which captures the strength and impartiality of the legal and political establishment in judicial matters, and an order component, which captures the extent to which residents of a country accept established legal and political institutions as the solely legitimate way to make and implement laws and to adjudicate disputes.
Control of corruption is also from the ICRG survey on the likelihood that government officials illicit side payments for their private pockets. This variable characterizes the extent to which corruption is controlled. It ranges from 0-6, and a higher value means a better control over corruption.
We use another set of variables to capture the track record of the government in terms of fostering investment opportunities. These are:
Expected growth is the country's predicted real per capita GDP growth rate based on linear regression of the past five year's growth rates. We interpret a high past growth rate as both indicative of profitable investment opportunities and a track record of the country's government fostering, or at least not impeding, their exploitation. While we introduce these variables as controls, they are also, in part at least, reflections on the quality of each country's governments. Better governed countries typically have more telephones per capita, more educated people, and currencies that better hold their values.
Population, even, is not entirely unrelated to the quality of government, for emigration is a common response to misrule.
Finally, we must be concerned with how well current government quality predicts future government quality. Policies attractive to FDI may be of little effect in a country that undergoes coups every year or two. Corporate investment projects commit firms to operating in a host country for years, even decades. For example, oil exploration, development, and exploitation often have present value adjusted payback periods measured in decades. Foreign firms must be convinced that friendly policies are likely to continue, sometimes for very long periods, before FDI looks financially attractive.
To capture regime durability, we take from the PolityIV database the number of years since the country's most recent regime change. A "regime change" is not a simple change in leadership or parliamentary majority. Rather, a "regime change" is defined as a change of threepoints or more in the country's responsible government score (polity2 in the database) within a span of three years or less. Or, a regime change is defined as the end of unstable political institutions characterized by foreign invasions or anarchy.
Our ultimate objective is to see whether Chinese FDI inflow is "exceptional", or follows patterns similar to FDI flowing into other countries at similar levels of development. This is important because a marginal institutional improvement in Denmark is not necessarily comparable to a similar improvement in Indonesia. Going from one to two phones per Dane is not equivalent to going from zero to one phone per Indonesian. The former is likely inconsequential, while the latter could be highly important.
One way to deal with the problem is to introduce non-linear terms of institutional measures. That, however, would induce collinearity. Also, interpreting higher order terms of categorical variables can be tricky. Moreover, FDI flowing into less developed regions appears to have motivations (e.g. resource extraction) different than that flowing into highly developed economies (local market access).
We therefore instead choose a sample of benchmark countries that, collectively, resemble
China. That is, we consider countries in which the impact of a marginal improvement in institutions on FDI is likely to be in the same range as in China. We thus select all countries in the bottom 40 percent of our institutional measures (e.g., the bottom 40 percent of "executive constraints"). The 40% cutoff is not critical. Rerunning our analysis using, e.g., a 50% cutoff instead, generates similar results. 
FDI Allocation in China and the World, Compared
We now use our We then compare each prediction with the actual value of this variable for China each year and calculate the average of these differences -the model's mean prediction error for China. The final row gives these test statistics. prediction errors are within the bounds set by those for other developing economies. More interestingly, when the institutional variable is responsible government, the prediction errors narrow down gradually, and near the end of the sample period, the prediction error is quite close to being zero. Equally impressively, when we use the control of corruption variable and its associated sample, the prediction errors for China are quite close to the zero line. Note also that the prediction errors for China are "out-of-sample" while the others are "in-sample."
This success of the cross-country model in predicting FDI inflow into China means China does not seem exceptional. Given China's phenomenal track record and nice infrastructure, it should draw in a huge amount of FDI.
And none of this in any way implies that the poor quality of some aspects of China's institutions is irrelevant. But for its poor institutional environment, China would have attracted even more inward foreign direct investment.
To illustrate, consider the coefficients on expected growth across the specifications in In short, China is not an exception. China's high past growth and good infrastructure encourage FDI inflow; and its weak institutions in preventing policy reversal discourage FDI inflow. These effects are roughly in line with their operation in other weak institution countries.
Assessing Assessments of China's Institutions
The results in Table 3 , nevertheless, show apparent systematic prediction errors. The last row in Table 3 shows that the errors are, on average, positive in regressions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3; using executive power constraints, responsible government, and the rule of law, respectively, to gauge institutional quality. However, the prediction error is almost zero on average for regression 3.4, which gauges institutional quality (albeit insignificantly) by the control of corruption.
What are we to make of this?
China's responsible government index is invariant through the years we study at -7.0; while the rest of the weak-institution world manages a mean score of 0.15 (σ = 6.83). Since the variable theoretically can fall anywhere between -10 and 10, China's score is quite poor.
Similarly, China scores a 3.0 in the executive constraints variable every year, while the rest of the weak institution world averages around 3.8 (σ = 2.2). This variable ranges from 1 to 7. These data clearly suggest that the assessment on the Chinese governments is that they do not face many constraints and that they face little competition, even compared to weak institution countries.
Interesting, China's control for corruption score aligns roughly with the average for other weakinstitution countries. And, China's rule of law index is 4.6 (σ = 0.7), while the rest of the weakinstitution world manages an average of only 2.6 (σ = 1.1). The rule of law score theoretically ranges from 1 to 6. Thus, the performance of these indexes, benchmarked against the average of those from other weak institution countries, show suspicious variations. Why would China's low responsible government and executive constraints scores not match its decent score on the rule of law. Could the former two be too low while the score on the rule of law too high? Note that the former two are based on "expert assessments" and the "rule of law" score is a survey result.
On being communist
Obviously, China's low responsible government score derives from being a communist country.
But the Chinese Communist Party is far from homogeneous. It has multiple factions at both the central and provincial levels. This internal competition resembles, in some ways, the factional disputes in, for example Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Just as LDP factional struggles constrained the Japanese prime minister's freedom of action, disagreements within the CCP constrain the discretionary power of China's top leaders. Although these disputes were present to some degree through most of the history of the People's Republic, the secretive and sometimes bloody power struggles of the 20 th century seem to be giving way to more orderly ways of debating policy and handling, for example, the succession of power (see Keefer, 2006) . Old impressions are difficult to change.
Perhaps China's leaders really don't have the same unbridled executive powers wielded by dictators in other parts of the developing world. If so, might China's responsible government score -and especially its executive constraints score -both in a genuine sense be "too low"?
On being foreign
What about the rule of law in China? And are foreign investors' experiences with the Chinese legal system, especially those covered in the mass media, really representative? We suspect that foreign investors may well have an overly rosy perspective for two sets of reasons:
First, the rule of law variable is a survey result, while the executive constraints variable is constructed mechanically based on the structure of each country's government. A survey variable, of necessity, reflects foreign investors' post-entry rationalizations, rather than their pre-entry fears.
By self-selection and through the power of cognitive dissonance, the former is generally more positive than the latter. Foreign investors who had excessively negative views are more likely to have stayed away, or left early. Those with excessively positive views are more likely to stay on, and having stayed on, to rationalize their decisions ex post.
Second, business-government relationships are highly heterogeneous across China.
Surveys of foreign investors, who are active disproportionately in the more developed special economic zones and coastal provinces, may well have a more positive average experience than locals. (On the other hand, notice that the executive constraints and responsible government indices are for the whole of China.)
One country, many systems
The second set of issues merits further reflection. Section 4 shows that the corruption and property rights protection vary markedly from province to province, and FDI flows into provinces with higher quality governments. It might be desirable to divide China into smaller homogeneous regions, assign different index values to these regions, and observe whether the more refined regional indexes better explain China's regional FDI inflows. Unfortunately, measures of the rule of law, responsible government, the strength of constraints on executive power, and control on corruption in China are unavailable at the provincial level.
But there are other ways we might expand on this heterogeneity argument. Of special relevance to any discussion of FDI are different ways China's institutions might affect foreign firms versus domestic firms.
Various levels of Chinese governments often give preferential treatment to certain multinational firms (Huang, 2003) . Thus, foreign-controlled operations might actually have genuinely more developed institutional environments than Chinese controlled operations next door. Moreover, the same government entity often appoints the Party Committees of many different firms. These perhaps ought to be regarded as a single unit, a business group, for many purposesperhaps including the assignment of property rights. For example, SASAC through party committees and appointed management boards controls 168 state-owned groups, some of which also controls collections of listed firms (China Resource Groups).
Then there are companies spun out from "township and village" cooperative enterprises. 
Options on Institutions
Another possibility is that foreign corporate investors might see China as likely to undertake further institutional development that will enshrine effective constraints on executive power.
From this perspective, China's FDI inflow might be slightly elevated relative to that predicted given its current checks on executive power, but not given its likely future checks. In a sense, Given our findings, these lines of argument would seem to provide the only scope for
China being "exceptional". While we cannot deny their validity, the other explanations for the systematic nature of the regression errors in Table 3 seem, to us, at least as plausible.
So Is "Too Much" FDI Flowing into China?
Probably not. Residuals from using regression 3.2, which gauges the quality of government with the responsible government score, to predict FDI inflow into China (out-of-sample prediction) and into various other weak-institution countries (in-sample predictions).
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